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international comity or is influenced by domestic constitutional problems, such
as the proper function of courts in matters affecting foreign affairs. This
appears from one of the basic distinctions, that between so-called "territorial"
and "extraterritorial" confiscations: a "territorial" confiscation acts upon
property located within the territory of the confiscating state at the time of
the confiscation; an "extraterritorial" confiscation is one of property located
outside. As usually stated, the rule is that territorial confiscations will be sup-
ported but extraterritorial confiscations will not, on the theory that every state
is the sole sovereign over its own territory and is entitled to respect for its
acts there. Certainly, this rule is not a necessary legal consequence of the prin-
ciple of sovereignty, from which it is derived. If the aid of the state of the
forum is required to give effect to a territorial confiscation, the sovereignty of
that state is as relevant as the sovereignty of the confiscating state. Why should
the state of the forum subordinate its sovereignty to the law of the confiscating
state? Or, in the case of extraterritorial confiscations, why should the fact of
extraterritoriality automatically result in denying effect to the confiscation?
Conceivably, the policy of the state of the forum might be otherwise. Territorial
confiscations are, in fact, subject to the public policy of the state of the forum,
including recognition or nonrecognition by that state of the confiscating state:
and extraterritorial confiscations may sometimes be approved by the public
policy of the state of the forum, as in the case of the Litvinov Assignment. In
short, the answers to the questions in this field are more likely to be found
from an analysis of the policies behind the legal rules than from the rules them-
selves.
The book contains a useful bibliography and table of cases. Unfortunate
awkwardness of English usage distracts the reader's attention and occasional-
ly obscures the author's meaning.
ARTHUR R. ALBRECHT t
WAS JUSTICE DONE? THE ROSENBERG-SOBELL CASE. By Malcolm P. Sharp.
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956. Pp. xxxvi, 216. $3.50.
Was Justice Done was written because the author sensed a grave injustice
in the conviction and sentence of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton
Sobell for conspiracy to commit espionage in time of war. When a sensitive
legal scholar of Professor Sharp's standing makes serious charges against
the workings of the judicial process, the legal profession and those engaged
in the critical study of law should be deeply concerned. Sharp expresses his
charges against the fairness of the conviction and sentence somewhat ob-
liquely in the "Author's Preface":
"I think that the average intelligent citizen, after considering the
facts in this case, will come to doubt the justice of the conviction or at
Member of the California Bar.
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any rate will agree with me that a new trial should have been granted
on the evidence disclosed in the last defense motion. If he is at all
familiar with legal procedure, he will almost certainly feel that the speed
with which the final problems of this serious case were disposed of
created a dangerous and unacceptable precedent."'
He adds: "Further knowledge and reflection might increase one's doubt about
the sentence."'2
Initially, Sharp was "The Uneasy Spectator.' 3 The conviction came on
April 5, 1951, and was subject to review by one of the strongest courts in
the country, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4
Study of the record did not seriously shake Professor Sharp's confidence in
the verdict, nor did the careful, extensive opinion of the court of appeals.6
The report of newly discovered evidence that appeared to attack the credi-
bility of witnesses for the government, which came to his attention in May
1953, caused him to change his position on the fairness of the trial and the
validity of the conviction. 6 Thus, on May 16, 1953, "at the request of the
Rosenberg Committee," he made the following public comment:
"The statement in favor of mercy made on behalf of the Church has
reinforced the criticisms made by many Americans, of the severity of the
Rosenberg sentence.
"Moreover, the report of new evidence must shake the confidence of
many who, like me, have been willing to assume that the verdict of
'guilty' was fairly reached. The evidence relates to what may be re-
garded as details of the prosecution's case. Nevertheless, if defense
witnesses establish the identity of the newly discovered table, it will
cast serious doubt on the credibility of key witnesses for the prosecution
and the fairness of the trial as a whole. If the defense is not given a
chance to establish the identity of the table, it will be a denial of justice."17
In June 1953, Sharp joined the staff of defense counsel for the Rosenbergs
in the last stages of the case.8 In working on the various defense motions to
secure further review just prior to the defendants' execution, Sharp "had




4. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 850,
889 (1952).
5. Pp. 9, 11.
6. P. 11.
7. P. 14. The Apostolic Delegate had informed the Department of Justice and the
White House of appeals received by the Vatican for intervention in behalf of the Rosenbergs.
House Committee on Un-American Activities, Trial by Treason, H.R. Doc. No. 206, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1956).
8. P. 15.
9. Pp. 16, 147.
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nal defense theory that there was a conspiracy to commit espionage, but that
it did not include the Rosenbergs."' 0 To support this thesis, he attempts to
discredit the testimony of accomplice witnesses upon which the government
based its case.
The testimony and other presentations on behalf of the government sup-
ported fully the jury's verdict of "guilty as charged." They show the extensive
communist underground activities in transferring atomic and other military
secrets to the agent Yakovlev, who held diplomatic immunity." The most
critical conspiracy was the transmittal during World War II of military secrets
concerning the atomic bomb to the Russian agent. Julius Rosenberg-the trial
record reveals-somehow secured knowledge of the atomic bomb project and
prevailed upon his brother-in-law David Greenglass, who was assigned to the
Los Alamos bomb project as a technical sergeant in the United States Army,
to secure secret information concerning the experiments.' 2 Of four episodes
of espionage, the first occurred in November 1944, when Julius secured from
David a diagram of the layout of the Los Alamos project, the real names of
the leading scientists working there on the atomic bomb experiments and
other information. 13 The second occurred in January 1945, when David pro-
vided Julius, at his request, with sketches and a written description of a lens
mold experiment, a list of nuclear scientists and a special list of persons at
Los Alamos who, as "progressives," might be recruits for espionage work in
the communist underground. 14 The third episode occurred in June 1945, when
Harry Gold, on courier trip to Santa Fe to obtain secret information from
Klaus Fuchs, was directed by Yakovlev to stop by the Greenglass apartment
in Albuquerque to obtain information about the high explosive lens mold
and the usual list of possible recruits for espionage work. Gold left an en-
velope with the Greenglasses containing five hundred dollars in bills. 1r The
last episode in the atomic bomb conspiracy occurred in September 1945. On
this occasion, David, at Julius's request, made sketches and prepared extensive
descriptions of a cross section of the post-Hiroshima bomb, which he delivered
to Julius for transmittal to Yakovlev.' 6 After the news of Klaus Fuchs's
confession, Julius directed David to leave the United States with his family:
and, upon Harry Gold's arrest in June 1950, Julius paid David five thousand
dollars and offered him six thousand more to leave the country immediately.
10. P. 214.
11. Government's Exhibit 15, Transcript of Record, pp. 846-47, United States v. Rosen-
berg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952) (citations are to the unofficial printed record of the
trial).
12. Id. pp. 679-80.
13. Government's Exhibit 1, id. pp. 425-27, 680-85.
14. Id. pp. 427-29, 440-43, 470-73. This information was so significant that Julius
arranged for David to meet with a Russian agent who questioned him at length about the
high explosive lens experiments at the Los Alamos project. Id. pp. 451-55.
15. Id. pp. 444-66, 687-701, 821-29.
16. Pp. 36-38; Government's Exhibit 8, Record, pp. 489-513, 624-28, 910-11.
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The Greenglasses were to go to Mexico City and Julius was to arrange
transportation to Czechoslovakia.' 7
In the second conspiracy, the government's indictment charged Julius
Rosenberg with instigation and direction of espionage activities to secure
information about classified experiments in warmaking technology.' s Morton
Sobell was one of the coconspirators. On this charge, the government's case
rested solely upon the testimony of Max Elitcher, who had been associated
with Rosenberg and Sobell in the Young Communist League at City College
from 1934 to 1938, and later in Washington. 9 According to Elitcher, Rosen-
berg solicited secret information from him and confided to him that Sobell
and others were aiding Russia by supplying Rosenberg with various military
secrets.20 Apart from evidence of his flight to Mexico at the time of David
Greenglass's arrest,2 1 Sobell's espionage was constructed from Elitcher's
testimony of conversations with him about secret data and of his delivery of
classified information to Rosenberg.22
A criminal trial constitutes one of the most delicate and complex processes
of government. As a principal organ of the day by day functioning of the free
society, the criminal trial is democracy in action and must function subject to
the forces that provide collective animation through the society. The Rosen-
berg-Sobell trial was subject to several powerful influences: the understand-
ably strong reaction of the American people to revelations of espionage and
subversion through the communist party and the communist underground,
the intensity of the world-wide struggle with Russia and the war in Korea.
Preservation of the essential integrity of the legal processes of the trial was made
more difficult by the loose and unco-ordinated form of the conspiracy indict-
ment. Sobell's participation in espionage was virtually unconnected with the
other conspiracy to transmit military secrets on the atomic bomb project at Los
Alamos. The connection between the two rested on the generalizations that
Rosenberg had administered both conspiracies and both were in furtherance
of the goals of the same foreign government.23
17. Id. pp. 522-37, 792-98, 1420-24.
18. C. 4.
19. Record, pp. 215-33.
20. Id. pp. 232-39.
21. Sobell and his wife were seized and returned to the United States by Mexican
security agents. Id. pp. 263, 857-67, 927-30, 932-38. The government's case against Sobell
was based heavily on flight; Sobell had used bogus names in travelling in Mexico and in
communications with persons in the United States, and had planned to continue to South
America or Europe as had been outlined by Rosenberg to Greenglass. See also Brief for
the Government, pp. 9-11, United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1957), ajlrining
142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); House Committee on Un-American Activities, Trial
by Treason, H.R. Doc. No. 206, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 121 (1956) ; Davidson, The First
Real Story of the Big Atomic-Bomb Plot, Look, Oct. 29, 1957, p. 96.
22. Record, pp. 210-63, 350-79.
23. Judge Kaufman instructed the jury that the question for their ultimate determi-
nation was whether Sobell was a member of the broad generalized conspiracy "to obtain
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Sharp's attack on the Rosenberg-Sobel convictions centers on the accom-
plice testimony of David and Ruth Greenglass. 2 4 One chapter, titled "The
Critics," exemplifies the book's tone; Sharp details with approval the criti-
cisms of Stephen Love of the Chicago Bar and of Harold C. Urey, inter-
nationally famous nuclear physicist.25 Mr. Love states that "the story of
David Greenglass is so obviously false in so many material respects that he
is entitled to no credence. ' 26 He asserts as a generally accepted fact that
Greenglass lacked the technical qualifications to prepare sketches and de-
scriptions of the lens mold and the post-Hiroshima bomb and that, even if
qualified in 1944 and 1945, he could not possibly have reproduced these in
1950 for use at the trial.2 7 That Greenglass's work placed him in a position
to secure knowledge of the lens mold for detonating the atomic bomb was
amply corroborated by the nuclear scientist in charge, who testified that at
various times he had given information and sketches to the machinists for
guides in construction.2 8 Whether Greenglass actually made the reproduc-
tions offered as government exhibits without the aid of scientists assisting
the government in the prosecution of the case-a question of evidence-was
challenged neither by defense counsel nor by Judge Kaufman.
Mr. Urey details his criticisms at length.2 9 While not doubting Green-
glass's competence as a machinist to have made the sketches and descriptions,
he believes that the Rosenbergs were not necessary parties to the Fuchs-
Yakovlev-Gold-Greenglass conspiracy to transmit atomic secrets to the Rus-
sians. He concludes that when the Greenglasses were trapped after the con-
fessions of Fuchs and Gold, they implicated the Rosenbergs, with whom they
were having financial and personal differences, in order to escape the maximum
penalty for the atomic espionage in which they were involved. No direct
evidence connected Yakovlev with Rosenberg, and Gold had no contact with
Rosenberg. The testimony of the Greenglasses, Urey writes, "contains un-
secret information pertaining to the national defense and then to transmit it to the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is not a conspiracy to obtain information only about the
atom bomb. I point that out because the Government contends that Sobell was in the
general conspiracy to obtain information of a secret nature .. . ." Id. pp. 1542, 1560. See
Judge Frank's dissent on this point, United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 600-02 (2d
Cir. 1952), and the high-level treatment of the conspiracy question in Note, The Rosenberg
Case: Some Reflections on Federal Criminal Law, 54 COLU . L. REv. 219, 228-33 (1954).
24. Another basis for attack was the speed with which the district court, the court
of appeals, and the Supreme Court denied the Rosenbergs' final motions for a new trial.
Pp. xxxiv, 16, 156-67. See also Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 277-83 (1953)
(listing of the large number of petitions for collateral attack), and the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter asserting that the issues had been disposed of without adequate de-








believable statements, that the plausibilities of certain details of their testi-
mony can be explained, that they had powerful motives for involving the
Rosenbergs unjustly, and, finally, that all the facts of the atomic espionage
can be accounted for without the involvement of the Rosenbergs at all." 30
Although Mr. Urey's disbelief in the Greenglasses' testimony is undoubtedly
sincere, credibility of witnesses in our judicial system is a matter for determi-
nation by the jury and for appellate courts upon review when credibility is
entwined with the question of the legal sufficiency of evidence. 31 Little in
Urey's unsupported conjectures causes uneasiness about the jury's verdict.
The principal factor contributing to Professor Sharp's disbelief in the
testimony of accomplice witnesses was the later discovery of a console table. 2
Greenglass testified about gifts, the table among them, to the Rosenbergs for
spy activities. 33 The Rosenbergs testified that the furniture in their apartment
was secondhand, with the exception of a small console table which they had
purchased at Macy's in 1944 or 1945.34 Ruth Greenglass connected the table
with Julius's underground activities:
"I admired the table and I asked Ethel when she bought a new piece
of furniture; she said she had not bought it, she had gotten it as a gift
.. .and Julius said it was from his friend and it was a special kind
of table, and he turned the table on its side to show us why it was so
special . . . .There was a portion of the table that was hollowed out
for a lamp to fit underneath it so that the table could be used for photo-
graph purposes, and he said when he used the table he darkened the
room so that there would be no other light and he wouldn't be obvious
to anyone looking in."' 5
Because the table loomed large in the testimony, introduction into evidence
of either the large console table described by Mrs. Greenglass or the Macy
table described by the Rosenbergs would have been significant. Two years
after the conviction and sentence, the defense claimed to have found the Macy
table in the apartment of Julius Rosenberg's mother.8 6 The very report of
the discovery in the National Guardian during an inspired campaign against
the Rosenberg trial and sentence was almost enough to make the honesty
of the claim suspect. 37 Judge Kaufman considered the question an aspect of
30. P. xvii.
31. Frank, J., in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 592 (2d Cir. 1952).
32. C. 10.
33. Record, pp. 521-22.
34. Id. pp. 1054-55, 1297-98.
35. Id. pp. 706-07, 1409-10; p. 119.
36. Pp. 12, 112. The FBI was unable to locate the console table. See Davidson, supra
note 21, p. 103.
37. See House Committee on Un-American Activities, Trial by Treason, H.R. Doc.
No. 206, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 24, 39, 114, 120 (1956); Fiedler, A Postcript to the
Rosenberg Case, 1 ENCOUNTER 12-13 (1953), reprinted in FIEDULR, AN END TO INNOCENCE
25-26 (1955).
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due diligence: defense counsel "had not satisfied the requirement of diligence,"
since the table had remained in the Rosenberg family for the period of the trial
and the two years following.38 In short, the proof required for the objective
reader to assess the charges of unreliability against the Greenglasses and their
testimony has not been presented. Thus, the Sharp book is an effort to impute
to the trial and conviction of the Rosenbergs reflections of legal persecution
in the trial and punishment of innocent men as shown by documented studies
to have been the consequence of socially-pressured defalcations in the Drey-
fuss and Sacco-Vanzetti trials.
The significant factor of the Rosenberg-Sobell trial, for critical study of the
workings of the judicial process, is judge Kaufman's decree of the death
penalty.39 The case illustrates the confusion presently surrounding capital
punishment as an institution. In Rosenberg, each official responsible for
making and abiding by the death decree fulfilled his oath of office upon as
high a professional and ethical standard as he was capable. The security of
the United States was seriously involved in these espionage conspiracies.
While the atomic bomb secrets were transmitted during the years 1944 and
1945, the Rosenberg-Sobell-Elitcher conspiracy to commit espionage con-
tinued actively into the summer of 1950 and the beginning of the Korean
War. In these circumstances, the prosecutor, Mr. Saypol, thought it his
"absolute duty" to recommend the maximum penalty allowable by statute, in
order to deter those who would aid in the nation's destruction.40  Judge
Kaufman did not consider the prosecutor's recommendation a basis for the
court's decree of the death penalty: "The responsibility is so great that I
believe that the court alone should assume this responsibility."'41 Accordingly,
he addressed the Rosenbergs:
"What I have to say is not easy for me. I have deliberated for hours,
days and nights. I have carefully weighed the evidence. Every nerve,
every fibre of my body has been taxed. I am just as human as are the
people who have given me the power to impose sentence. I am convinced
beyond any doubt of your guilt. I have searched the records-I have
searched my conscience-to find some reason for mercy-for it is only
human to be merciful and it is natural to try to spare lives. I am con-
vinced, however, that I would violate the solemn and sacred trust that
the people of this land have placed in my hands were I to show leniency
to the defendants Rosenberg." 42
Nevertheless, the death penalty was not appropriate in the circumstances
of the case, and the process of sentencing lacked any semblance of a judicial
38. Pp. 152, 156. A practical study would probably show that newly discovered evidence
is not of much value to the defense for attacking a conviction based on substantial evidence.
See also Hiss, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION 263-86 (1957).
39. See Frank, J., in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 603-09, 611 (2d Cir.
1952) ; Black, J., dissenting in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 300-01 (1953).
40. Record, pp. 1600-03.
41. Id. p. 1612.
42. Id. p. 1616.
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process. The government's case against Ethel Rosenberg was limited to ac-
complice evidence of her aid to Julius in procuring atomic secrets. This alone
did not support the death penalty. Still, the fact that she had not discouraged
Julius in his activities in espionage made her, in Judge Kaufman's words, "a
full-fledged partner in this crime." 43 Capital punishment of Julius Rosenberg
also cannot be supported, even though the government's case against him
was substantial on the espionage conspiracy relating to communication of the
secret technology of the atomic bomb. Legislative delegation of sentencing
authority assumes the application of present standards of criminology and
presupposes relation of the statutory penalty-euphemistically called "punish-
ment"-to the inens rea of the offender. The general policy of the statute was
effectively satisfied by breaking up the Rosenbergs' activities and by trial and
conviction.44 But prosecutor and judge apparently related the death penalty
to the policy of the statute as an official act necessary to eradicate communist
underground espionage. As a result, the penalty bore no relationship to the
individual's responsibility in light of the legislative proscription. A lesser
sentence-for example, the alternative maximum penalty of thirty years-
might have made the government's case more acceptable to the American
and world community.
The shifting sands of international order and the emotions stirred by later
events imparted into the trial extraneous considerations, through which the
essential fairness and integrity of the sentencing process may be attacked.
In recommending the death sentence, Mr. Saypol reminded the court that
Judge Learned Hand had moved outside the record to international events to
uphold the Smith Act in United States v. Dennis.45 The government's argu-
ments in support of the death penalty relied on the facts that the Rosenbergs
had given their allegiance to the "real enemy" in the war in Korea, had "used
methods of espionage which traditionally called for severe punishment" and
had "affected the lives, and perhaps the freedom, of whole generations of
mankind.14 In light of these considerations, there was no room for com-
passion or mercy. Judge Kaufman described espionage as "a sordid, dirty
work ... with but one paramount theme, the betrayal of one's own country. '47
In addition to the atomic bomb conspiracy, the Rosenbergs were involved in
a second plot continuing until the beginning of the war in Korea. When the
43. Ibid.
44. The Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 STAT. 217. The prosecutor and Judge
Kaufman were disturbed because the statute did not allow the alternative sentence of im-
prisonment for life instead of "not more than thirty years" or twenty years when espionage
was committed not in time of war. Record, pp. 1603, 1613.
45. 183 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
46. Record, pp. 1602-03. Defense counsel thought that Mr. Saypol had "introduced
political considerations of a very weighty character" and that the Rosenbergs should be
judged by what "they may have intended in 1944 and 1945." Id. pp. 1603, 1605-06.
47. Id. p. 1613.
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conspiracies are lumped together, as they were at trial, the seriousness of the
crime is magnified. This was in essence the position of Judge Kaufman. But
the atomic bomb conspiracy dominated his thinking when he said to the
Rosenbergs:
"I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate contem-
plated murder is dwarfed in magnitude by comparison with the crime
you have committed.... I believe your conduct in putting into the hands
of the Russians the A-bomb years before our best scientists predicted
Russia would perfect the bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the
Communist aggression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding
50,000 and who knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay
the price of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly
have altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country. '48
To justify the death penalty, Judge Kaufman greatly overstates the relation-
ship of the international problems of the 1945-50 period to the Rosenbergs'
motive and intent. He makes the crime greater in 1951 than at the time of com-
mission. The case illustrates the difficulties of excluding society's demand for
revenge from the process of conviction and even more from the process of
sentencing. The emotional basis of revenge and retaliation in fact entered
the sentencing process, although the stated basis was deterrence. The prose-
cutor expressed the view that "leniency would be merely an invitation to
increased activity by those dedicated to the concept that compassion is de-
cadent and mercy an indication of weakness." 49 Deterrence for Judge Kauf-
man was extirpation: "In light of the circumstances, I feel that I must pass
such sentence upon the principles [sic] in this diabolical conspiracy ... which
will demonstrate with finality that this nation's security must remain inviolate
"50
These considerations strongly suggest the need for judicial review of sen-
tences on appeal. Precedent effectively isolated the court of appeals from the
48. Id. pp. 1614-15.
49. Id. p. 1603.
50. Id. p. 1615. The British Royal Commission has noted that the principle of retribu-
tion has been used in two senses: vengeance and reprobation, the latter being "that of the
State's marking its disapproval of the offence." According to Lord Justice Denning, appear-
ing before the Royal Commission, "the ultimate justification of any punishment is not
that it is a deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime
." OYAL COalausslON ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT 18 (1953).
Deterrence is actually based upon the continued vigor of individual and collective belief in
the justification of societal vengeance. See Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death
Penalty, 284 THE ANNALS 54, 55, 62 (1952). The logic of Diodotus which was given in his
reply to Cleon's proposal that the Mitylenians be put to death is unassailable against the
supposed deterrence factor in capital punishment: "Mankind has run the whole gamut of
penalties, making them more and more severe in the hope that transgressions of evil-doers
might be abated.... Either, then, some terror more dreadful than death must be discovered,




fairness, substance and legal validity of the sentencing proceedings.5 1 Appellate
review of criminal trials is a recent development in Anglo-American law,52 but
the dividends have been significant in the century of its existence in America.
Criminal trials have been formalized, institutionalized and fashioned into the
general over-all legal structure of lawmaldng6 3 Judicial review has also furn-
ished a measure of insulation from the community pressures involved in 'the
criminal trial. Similarly, the sentencing process should be brought within the
ambit of the general legal structure.5 4 The sentence contains dashes of com-
munity pressures-vengeance, dashes of the individual or group propensity
to repeat certain crimes-recidivism, and dashes of the policy of stamping out
certain offenses against society-deterrence.5 5 Needed is the institutionalizing
process of appellate review of sentences so that the whole of the criminal trial
may be analyzed with relation to the legal principles created in the process of
insulated decision-making.
Was Justice Done proselytizes one view of the Rosenberg case. As such, it
is an aspect of the Rosenberg-Sobell trial as a phenomenon in the social history
of America in the 1940's and 1950's. Legal historians may study the case in
another day when they can examine more critically the degree to which the
judicial process had become saturated with the social pressures and attitudes of
the period. Certainly, the case provides a starting point for considering appel-
late review of the sentencing process and restriction, or even abolition, of the
51. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 603-09 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Memorandum
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952) ; Hall, Re-
duction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal: 1, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 521, 523 n.4 (1937);
ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALs IN AMERICA 103-04 (1939).
52. See Frankfurter, J., concurring in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956).
Appellate review has had varying breadth during our legal development. When it was ex-
tremely technical and literal, William Howard Taft and Mr. Justice Brewer thought
appellate review of criminal trials of small import and, indeed, harmful. See Taft, The
Administration of Criminal Law, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 14-16 (1905) ; Brewer, A Better Edi-
cation the Great Need of the Profession, 18 A.B.A. REP. 441, 448 (1895).
53. See, e.g., J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1947); DESSION, CRIMINAL
LAW ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER (1948); WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, TiE GEN-
ERAL PART (1953).
54. See L. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 521,
762 (1937) ; Sobeloff, A Recommnendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21
BROOKLYN L. Rav. 2 (1954). See also ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA C. 5 (1939) ;
Whalen, Punishment for Crime: The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 35 MINN. L.
REv. 109 (1951) ; Note, Appeals Against Sentence, 69 SCoT. L. REV. 97 (1953) ; Note, Due
Process and Legislative Standards in Sentencing, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 257 (1952). Appel-
late review of the criminal trial came late in England, with the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907,
7 Edw. 7, c. 23; but, because it came late, review of the sentence is made easily available.
O'Halloran, Development of the Right of Appeal in England in Criminal Cases, 27 CAN.
B. REv. 153 (1949).
55. See L. Hall, supra note 54, at 762; J. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 50-60,
539-70 (1947) ; Morris, Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 Ausma. L.J. 186 (1953). See
also Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099
(1953).
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death penalty. For, "this case is an incident in the long and unending effort to
develop and enforce justice according to law.... Only by sturdy self-examina-
tion and self-criticism can the necessary habits for detached and wise judgment
be established and fortified so as to become effective when the judicial process
is again subjected to stress and strain .... [A] 11 systems of law, however wise,
are administered through men and therefore may occasionally disclose the
frailties of men. Perfection may not be demanded of law, but the capacity to
counteract inevitable, though rare, frailties is the mark of a civilized legal
mechanism. ' '5 6
W. HOWARD MANNt
56. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953).
tAssociate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
